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Louisiana's "discretionary function exception," formally adopted by
the legislature in 1985, purports to shield Louisiana state and local
governmental entities and their officers and employees from liability
"based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform their policy-making or discretionary acts when such acts are
within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties."' Louis-
iana courts have indicated repeatedly that the Louisiana discretionary
function exception is substantially similar, if not identical, in purpose
and content to the federal discretionary function exception contained in
the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 The Louisiana courts have therefore
adopted federal jurisprudential standards for determining the applicability
of the Louisiana discretionary function exception.3
The Louisiana jurisprudence, relying upon earlier federal court de-
cisions, has drawn a distinction between acts performed or decisions
made at the "operational" level of an agency or agency program, and
those implemented at a "policy-making" or "ministerial" level.4 The
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAw REviEw.
* James A. Brown is a shareholder of Liskow & Lewis, P.L.C., New Orleans,
Louisiana, an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Louisiana State University Law Center,
and a member of the American, Louisiana, and New Orleans Bar Associations.
** John C. Anjier is an associate lawyer at Liskow & Lewis and a member of the
American, Louisiana, and New Orleans Bar Associations. The authors wish to express
thanks to William P. Janvier, a Liskow & Lewis associate, for valuable research and
editorial assistance.
1. La. R.S. 9:2798.1(B) (1991).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). E.g., Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 15 (La. 1989)
(on rehearing) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536, 108 S. Ct. 1954,
1958-59 (1988)); Industrial Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 735 F. Supp. 200,
202-03 (E.D. La. 1990) (applying Louisiana law); Kniepp v. City of Shreveport, 609 So.
2d 1163, 1165-66 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So. 2d 976 (1993).
3. E.g., Fowler, 556 So. 2d at 15 (on rehearing) (applying the standards adopted
in Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S. Ct. at 1958-59); Kniepp, 609 So. 2d at 1166;
Chaney v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 583 So. 2d 926, 929 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
4. Fowler, 556 So. 2d at 15.
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Louisiana courts have held that the Louisiana discretionary function
exception does not extend to protect discretionary actions, decisions, or
judgments of state or municipal employees that are found to have been
"operational" in nature. These decisions are marked by a tendency to
limit the application of the Louisiana exception by finding that a variety
of governmental decisions and actions were "operational" and therefore
ineligible for discretionary function immunity.5
The Louisiana courts, while continuing to profess adherence to
federal standards for application of Louisiana's discretionary function
exception, have yet to consider the impact upon those standards of the
United States Supreme Court's recent important decision in United States
v. Gaubert.6 In Gaubert, the Court, in a comprehensive analysis of the
federal discretionary function exception, clarified and arguably expanded
the scope of the exception. The Court expressly rejected the "opera-
tional" distinction relied upon in earlier federal court decisions, holding
that if the challenged official act or decision is discretionary in nature
and grounded in the policy of the federal agency or program, the federal
discretionary function exception immunizes that act or decision even
though implemented at an "operational" or "managerial" level of the
agency or program.' The Court also enunciated a "strong presumption"
that discretionary conduct allowed by regulation, agency policy, or in-
ternal agency guidelines is "grounded in the policy" of the agency and
hence entitled to discretionary function immunity.'
This article examines recent developments in the jurisprudence con-
struing and applying both the federal and Louisiana discretionary func-
tion exceptions and assesses the impact of the Gaubert decision upon
both the federal and Louisiana exceptions. As suggested below, if the
Louisiana courts were to follow the Gaubert analysis, the Louisiana
exception could be extended to immunize a broad range of "operational"
decisions, functions, and actions (including, merely by way of example,
the design and maintenance of public buildings, roadways, and other
5. E.g., Estate of Thomas v. State, 604 So. 2d 617, 624-25 (La. App. 2d Cir.)
(determining that the decision on where to place highway signs was "operational"), writ
denied, 608 So. 2d 167 (1992); Chaney, 583 So. 2d at 929-30 (stating that the decision
regarding the type of warning device to install at a railroad crossing was "operational"
because the legislature had already made the "policy" decision that the roadway should
be maintained in a reasonably safe condition); Valet v. City of Hammond, 577 So. 2d
155, 167 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the maintenance of a roadway was
"operational"); Tenahaaf v. Quenqui, 571 So. 2d 898, 899 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990)
(finding that a parish's decision as to whether to enforce state statutes and parish ordinances
requiring fire suppression and fire warning devices was not a "discretionary" or "policy-
making" act).
6. 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
7. Id. at 1275.
8. Id. at 1274-75.
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public facilities) which have long been assumed to be lucrative grist for
tort plaintiffs and their lawyers. 9 In addition, this article briefly addresses
recent, important developments affecting the constitutionality of the
Louisiana discretionary function exception and assesses the continuing
viability of the "public duty" doctrine in Louisiana law. The article
concludes with a call for judicial action to resolve the many remaining
uncertainties surrounding Louisiana's discretionary function exception.
II. FEDERAL LAW
A. Berkovitz
The federal discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
of the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), exempts the United States
from tort liability under the FTCA for
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid,
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.'0
The federal jurisprudence has recognized that the legislative purpose of
the federal discretionary function exception is to "'prevent judicial "sec-
ond-guessing" of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action
in tort.'''' 1
In Berkovitz v. United States, 2 the Supreme Court formulated what
have become the prevailing federal standards for application of the
discretionary function exception:
In examining the nature of the challenged conduct, a court must
first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the
acting employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language of
the exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves
an element of judgment or choice. Thus, the discretionary func-
tion exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation,
or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an em-
9. E.g., La. R.S. 9:2800 (1991) (imposing liability upon state and municipal entities
for the condition of public things, subject to the limitations provided in the statute).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
11. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1273 (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacoao
Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2765 (1984)).
12. 486 U.S. 531, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
19931 1489
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
ployee to follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful
option but to adhere to the directive. And if the employee's
conduct cannot appropriately be the product of judgment or
choice, then there is no discretion in the conduct for the dis-
cretionary function exception to protect.
Moreover, assuming the challenged conduct involves an el-
ement of judgment, a court must determine whether that judg-
ment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception
was designed to shield .... The exception, properly construed,
therefore protects only governmental actions and decisions based
on considerations of public policy. In sum, the discretionary
function exception insulates the Government from liability if the
action challenged in the case involves the permissible exercise
of policy judgment. a
Applying these standards, the Court reversed the dismissal of a child's
federal tort claim against federal agencies alleged to have negligently
licensed a laboratory to produce a polio vaccine and to have negligently
approved the release to the public of a particular lot of polio vaccine
which caused the child to contract polio. The Court held that the
petitioner's allegations, that the agencies had failed to comply with their
own policies for testing vaccine lots and for preventing the distribution
of non-complying lots, were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
the suit. Because the petitioner's complaint was directed at alleged official
activity that involved no policy discretion or judgment but rather violated
established agency policy, the discretionary function exception did not
require dismissal of the claim as pleaded.' 4
The Berkovitz Court did not draw a distinction between discretionary
functions and "operational" activities and gave no direct indication that
discretionary acts or decisions at the "operational" level would fall
outside of the protection of the federal discretionary function exception.
The Court, however, cited and relied upon certain of its prior decisions
that had referred to presumably unprotected "operational" activities and
functions."' Prior to Gaubert, several federal appellate courts, including
the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, relied upon language in Ber-
kovitz and these earlier Supreme Court decisions and held that a variety
of official acts and decisions, though discretionary in nature, were not
13. Id. at 536-37, 108 S. Ct. at 1958-59 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 547, 108 S. Ct. at 1964.
15. Id. at 536, 108 S. Ct. at 1958 (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
42, 73 S. Ct. 956, 971 (1953)); id. at 538 n.3, 108 S. Ct. at 1959 n.3 (citing Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69, 76 S. Ct. 122, 126-27 (1955)).
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protected because they were implemented at an "operational level" within
the particular agency or government program.' 6
B. Gaubert
In Gaubert, the United States Supreme Court, while reiterating the
Berkovitz test, clarified and arguably expanded the scope of the federal
discretionary function exception. Relying upon its earlier precedents, the
Court confirmed that the exception applies to activity that is "discre-
tionary in nature," involving 'an element of judgment or choice," ' "
and that is 'based on considerations of public policy.""
'8
Where Congress has delegated the authority to an inde-
pendent agency or to the executive branch to implement the
general provisions of a regulatory statute and to issue regulations
to that end, there is no doubt that planning-level decisions
establishing programs are protected by the discretionary function
exception, as is the promulgation of regulations by which the
agencies are to carry out the programs. In addition, the actions
of Government agents involving the necessary element of choice
and grounded in the social, economic, or political goals of the
statute and regulations are protected.
Under the applicable precedents, therefore, if a regulation
mandates particular conduct, and the employee obeys the di-
rection, the government will be protected because the action will
be deemed in furtherance of the policies which led to the prom-
ulgation of the regulation. If the employee violates the man-
datory regulation, there will be no shelter from liability because
there is no room for choice and the action will be contrary to
policy. 19
After reciting these fairly well established standards, the Court enun-
ciated a "strong presumption" in favor of application of the discre-
tionary function exception when statute, regulation, or internal agency
guidelines or procedures allow the particular agent or employee to ex-
ercise discretion.
16. E.g., Arizona Maintenance Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1497, 1501 (9th Cir.
1989); United States v. Gaubert, 885 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th Cir. 1989), rev'd, Gaubert,
III S. Ct. at 1271; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 806 F.2d 1529, 1535-
36 (11th Cir. 1986).
17. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1273 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S. Ct. at
1958).
18. Id. at 1274 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537, 108 S. Ct. at 1959).
19. Id. (citations omitted).
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On the other hand, if a regulation allows the employee discretion,
the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption
that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves
consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation
of the regulations.
Not all agencies issue comprehensive regulations, however.
Some establish policy on a case-by-case basis, whether through
adjudicatory proceedings or through administration of agency
programs. Others promulgate regulations on some topics, but
not others. In addition, an agency may rely on internal guidelines
rather than on published regulations. In any event, it will most
often be true that the general aims and policies of the controlling
statute will be evident from its text.
When established governmental policy, as expressed or im-
plied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Gov-
ernment agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that
the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that
discretion. For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it
must allege facts which would support a finding that the chal-
lenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to
be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime. The focus
of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising
the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but on the
nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible
to policy analysis. 20
The Court's language, which does not appear in earlier decisions, seems
to place the burden upon the plaintiff, at the pleadings stage, to allege
facts that, if true, would be sufficient to rebut the presumption (created
when the statute, regulation, or guideline allows the employee discretion)
that the challenged discretionary conduct was grounded in the policy of
the regulatory regime. 2 1 Under a fair reading of the Court's language,
once the government has established the existence of a statute, regulation,
or guideline allowing an employee discretion, the burden would shift to
the plaintiff to prove facts sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor
of discretionary function immunity. 22
20. Id. at 1274-75.
21. It should be noted, however, that the Court, in footnote 7 of its opinion,
recognized that certain acts, although discretionary in nature, are obviously not based
upon or grounded in the policy or goals of the regulatory regime. "If one of the officials
involved in this case drove an automobile on a mission connected with his official duties
and negligently collided with another car, the exception would not apply. Although driving
requires the constant exercise of discretion, the official's decisions in exercising that
discretion can hardly be said to be grounded in regulatory policy." Id. at 1275 n.7.
22. But see Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Gaubert,
of course, did not deal with the burden of proof question").
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The Gaubert Court also, repudiated the "operational" test applied
by the Fifth Circuit below and employed in earlier federal decisions.
According to the Court, the Fifth Circuit had misinterpreted the Court's
earlier references to "operational" actions2 as "perpetuating a nonex-
istent dichotomy between discretionary functions and operational activ-
ities."24 The Court denied that its earlier decisions had recognized or
applied such an "operational" distinction or standard.2 The Court held
that the discretionary function exception applies to acts or decisions at
the "operational level" of an agency or program if those acts or decisions
are discretionary in nature and grounded in the policy of the agency
or applicable statute, regulation, or agency guideline.
In light of our cases and their interpretation of § 2680(a),
it is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
exception does not reach decisions made at the operational or
management level of the bank involved in this case. A discre-
tionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is
nothing in that description that refers exclusively to policy mak-
ing or planning functions. Day-to-day management of banking
affairs, like the management of other businesses, regularly re-
quire [sic] judgment as to which of a range of permissible courses
is the wisest. Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy
or planning level. "[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than
the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary
function exception applies in a given case." '2 6
Applying these standards to the facts before it, the Gaubert Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that the challenged actions of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board in supervising the day-to-day operations
of a troubled financial institution were discretionary functions and ex-
empt from liability under the FTCA. The Court thus exempted from
tort liability a broad range of day-to-day "operational" activities of
bank board employees relating to the institution, including: (a) arranging
for the hiring of consultants on operational and financial matters and
asset management, (b) urging or directing that the institution convert
from a state-chartered savings and loan to a federally-chartered savings
and loan, (c) giving advice and making recommendations concerning
whether, when, and how to place the institution's subsidiaries into
bankruptcy, (d) mediating salary disputes between the financial institution
and its senior officers, (e) reviewing a draft complaint in litigation that
23. E.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42, 73 S. Ct. 956, 971 (1953);
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69, 76 S. Ct. 122, 126-27 (1955).
24. Gaubert, II1 S. Ct. at 1275.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citations omitted).
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the institution contemplated filing and other involvement in litigation
matters, (f) intervening with state regulatory authorities regarding matters
of supervision, and (g) other low-level decisions and actions relative to
the operation of the institution. 27 All of these actions, decisions, and
functions, although "involving the day-to-day management of a business
concern ... at the operational level," were entitled to immunity because
they were discretionary in nature and were presumed to have been
undertaken for policy reasons of concern to the regulatory agency. 28
C. Federal Jurisprudence After Gaubert
Notwithstanding the attention that legal scholars have given to the
Gaubert decision, 29 several federal circuit courts have discussed the de-
cision only briefly, and others apparently have yet to take the full
measure of the decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Routh
v. United States,30 mentioning Gaubert only briefly, held that the failure
of a government officer to require a contractor to install safety equipment
was not discretionary because, although under the government's contract
the officer had discretion in determining whether particular safety equip-
ment was necessary, the officer's judgments on such safety matters did
not involve "policy decisions." And the Ninth Circuit, in Prescott v.
United States,3 denied the government summary judgment, holding that
there were issues -of fact as to whether the government's acts in the
administration of a nuclear testing program were discretionary functions
and that the government bears the burden of proving the applicability
of the discretionary function exception. The Ninth Circuit mentioned
Gaubert only in a footnote.32 One would have thought that, after Gaub-
ert, summary judgment would have been appropriate to dismiss claims
predicated upon the federal government's administration of its nuclear
testing program, but the Ninth Circuit held to the contrary, due in part
27. Id. at 1276.
28. Id. at 1278.
29. E.g., Peter G. Weinstock & Christopher T. Klimko, Banking Law Developments,
45 Sw. L.J. 1265, 1271 (1992); Carolyn K. Dick, Note, United States v. Gaubert: Potential
Liability for Federal Regulators Under the "Discretionary Function" Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 S.D. L. Rev. 180 (1991); Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can
the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the Discretionary Function Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 837 (1992); Medora Marisseau, Comment, Seeing
Through the Fallout: Radiation and the Discretionary Function Exception, 22 Envtl. L.
1509 (1992); Lawrence G. Baxter, Judicial Responses to the Recent Enforcement Activities
of the Federal Banking Regulators, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 5193, 5227-28 (1991); Grace M.
Giesel, A Proposal for a Tort Remedy for Insureds of Insolvent Insurers Against Brokers,
Excess Insurers, Reinsurers, and the State, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 1075, 1120-28 (1991).
30. 941 F.2d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
31. 973 F.2d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. Id. at 702 n.4.
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to the government's failure to offer evidence that its acts were grounded
in political, social, or economic policy.
However, in Attallah v. United States,33 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, with only a brief discussion of Gaubert, held that the decisions
of customs agents as to whether to stop and search particular passengers,
and as to the supervision of other customs agents, were discretionary
decisions entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exception.
The Eighth Circuit in TracorIMBA, Inc. v. United States,3 4 engaging
in a more detailed analysis of Gaubert and its presumption, held that
government inspectors' particularized decisions and actions when check-
ing ventilation and flame-retardancy of clothing were within the discre-
tion contemplated by applicable agency regulations and hence entitled
to discretionary function immunity. Likewise, in Kiehn v. United States,"
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "failure to warn"
and "negligent rescue" claims of an individual climbing on sandstone
in Dinosaur National Monument should have been dismissed under the
discretionary function exception. The court held that the plaintiff failed
to allege facts to support a finding that the challenged governmental
actions were not grounded in policy and therefore failed to overcome
the Gaubert presumption.3 6 In Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 7 the Tenth Circuit
again applied Gaubert, upholding the dismissal of a claim against the
government based upon decisions made in the cleanup of a CERCLA
site.
The somewhat inconsistent analyses and results of the recent federal
decisions indicate that the full impact of Gaubert has yet to be realized.
In fairness, it should be observed that the application of the discretionary
function exception is inherently fact sensitive, such that it cannot be
expected that particular decisions will always be predictable or appear
consistent with one another. With the passage of time, increased lower
court adherence to the Gaubert rationale should lead to a greater uni-
formity of analysis and result, as well as to an expanded application
of the federal discretionary function exception.
III. LOUISIANA LAW
A. Pre-Gaubert Law
The Louisiana discretionary function exception, codified at Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:2798.1(B) and (C), provides, in pertinent part:
33. 955 F.2d 776, 786 (1st Cir. 1992).
34. 933 F.2d 663, 667-68 (8th Cir. 1991).
35. 984 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1993).
36. Id. at 1105.
37. 972 F.2d 1527, 1542 (10th Cir. 1992).
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B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their
officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform their policy-making or
discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope
of their lawful powers and duties.
C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not
applicable:
(1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related
to the legitimate governmental objective for which the pol-
icy-making or discretionary power exists; or
(2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraud-
ulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless,
or flagrant misconduct.3"
Although the Louisiana discretionary function exception is worded
differently than the federal exception, the Louisiana courts have re-
peatedly indicated that the Louisiana exception is substantially similar,
if not identical, to the federal exception in purpose, substance, and
content.3 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court and appellate courts have there-
fore adopted the federal Berkovitz test for application of the Louisiana
discretionary function exception. 40
In Fowler v. Roberts,4 a three-Justice plurality of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in a rehearing opinion rendered a little over one year
before Gaubert was decided, embraced the two-part Berkovitz test.
38. The Louisiana statute, unlike its federal counterpart, immunizes not only the
public entity but the individual officer or employee that exercised the discretionary function.
One Louisiana appellate decision, however, contains language that could be construed to
read out of the statute its protection of individual government officers and employees.
See Akins v. Parish of Jefferson, 529 So. 2d 27, 30-31 (La. App. 5th Cir.) ("La. R.S.
9:2798.1 limits the liability of public entities, their employees, or their officers for acts
reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policy making
or discretionary power exists. It does not address the individual liability of a public official
or their officers or employees"), rev'd in part on other grounds, 533 So. 2d 970 (1988).
39. E.g., Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 15 (La. 1989) (on rehearing) ("The
discretionary function exception to state governmental liability established by the statute
is essentially the same as the exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act."); Industrial Risk
Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 735 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (E.D. La. 1990) (applying
Louisiana law and citing Fowler, 556 So. 2d at 15 (on rehearing)); Kniepp v. City of
Shreveport, 609 So. 2d 1163, 1165-66 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So. 2d
976 (1993); Estate of Thomas v. State, 604 So. 2d 617, 624 (La. App. 2d Cir.) ("The
LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1 immunity from liability for discretionary acts is essentially the same
as the immunity conferred on the federal government by the exception in the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA)"), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 167 (1992).
40. E.g., Fowler, 556 So. 2d at 15 (on rehearing); Estate of Thomas, 604 So. 2d at
624; Chaney v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 583 So. 2d 926, 929 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991); Verdun v. State, 559 So. 2d 877, 879 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
41. Fowler, 556 So. 2d 1, 13 (on rehearing).
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Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S. Ct. 1954,
100 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1988), held that there is a two step inquiry
for determining whether the discretionary function exception
applies in specific fact situations. A court must first consider
whether the government employee had an element of choice.
"[T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a
federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
course of action for an employee to follow. In this event, the
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive."
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S. Ct. at 1958-59, 100 L. Ed.
2d at 540-41. If the employee had no discretion or choice as
to appropriate conduct, there is no immunity. When discretion
is involved, the court must then determine whether that discretion
is the kind which is shielded by the exception, that is, one
grounded in social, economic or political policy. If the action
is not based on public policy, the government is liable for any
negligence, because the exception insulates the government from
liability only if the challenged action involves the permissible
exercise of a policy judgment. 42
The plurality, following the example of pre-Gaubert federal and state
court decisions, also approved the "operational" test or distinction,
stating that "the exception protects the government from liability only
at the policy making or ministerial level, not at the operational level." '43
In a questionable application of these principles, the Fowler plurality
held that the Louisiana Department of Public Safety's blanket waiver
of the requirement that handicapped drivers submit updated medical
reports in order to obtain renewed drivers' licenses was not entitled to
protection under the Louisiana discretionary function exception. The
plurality opined that, although the applicable statute permitted the de-
partment to waive the requirement of medical reports on handicapped
persons applying for renewal licenses, the department's blanket waiver
of medical reports in all cases constituted a total "failure to exercise
any discretion," a "lack of policy" which was not entitled to discre-
tionary function protection. The plurality found that, because the de-
partment failed to impose any standards for renewals of such licenses,
its decision to issue a renewal without requiring a medical report was
"operational" and hence not entitled to protection. The court also found
that because the department had "advanced no rationale to justify its
lack of policy," its failure to adopt a policy could not be regarded as
a policy decision protected by the discretionary function exception."
42. Id. at 15 (on rehearing).
43. Id. (citing Pendergrass v. State of Oregon, 675 P.2d 505, 507 (Or. App. 1984)).
44. Id. at 16 (on rehearing).
19931 1497
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In vigorous dissents, three Justices maintained that the department's
permissible and discretionary decision to waive in all cases the require-
ment of medical reports for renewed handicapped drivers' licenses was
precisely the kind of discretionary judgment intended to be protected
by the discretionary function exception. The dissenters found no rational
basis for the plurality's opinion that the challenged departmental decision
was "operational," and found that, because the challenged decision was
expressly permitted by the controlling statute, it was a protected dis-
cretionary function. 4
Justice Dennis, in a well-reasoned concurring opinion, agreed with
the dissenting Justices' criticism of the plurality, opining that
[tihe precedent set by the majority opinion's analysis may lead
this court to second-guess the wisdom of law and policy adopted
(or not adopted) by administrative agencies, the executive branch
and the legislative branch in a multitude of future cases. This
is not the proper role of the courts under the Constitutional
separation of powers and the doctrine of governmental immunity
which serves to protect that separation."'
As the dissenting and concurring Justices observed, the Fowler plur-
ality's reasoning, that a state department, although granted discretion,
may not claim exemption for a failure to exercise that discretion or to
formulate policies or guidelines, is subject to serious question. The
Louisiana discretionary function statute expressly provides that liability
"shall not be imposed ... based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform ... policy-making or discretionary
acts.'
47
The plurality's opinion, however, may find support in subparagraph
C(1) of the Louisiana statute which provides, in part, that the Louisiana
discretionary function exception is not applicable "[tlo acts or omissions
which are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective
for which the policy-making or discretionary power exists." One could
make a fair case that an agency's total abdication of discretion or its
deliberate failure to implement any policies or guidelines for the exercise
of discretion is not "reasonably related to the legitimate governmental
objective for which the policy-making or discretionary power exists."
Indeed, the language of subparagraph C(1) of the Louisiana statute,
which is not contained in the federal statute, could be construed to
45. Id. at 18-19 (Marcus, J., dissenting); Id. at 19 (Cole, J., dissenting); Id. at 19-
20 (Calogero, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 18 (Dennis, J., concurring). Justice Dennis, although joining in the dis-
senters' criticism of the plurality's treatment of the discretionary function exception,
concurred in the plurality's result, imposing liability upon the Department of Public Safety
on other grounds.
47. La. R.S. 9:2798.1(B) (1991) (emphasis added).
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empower a court to weigh the reasonableness of the agency's decision
or act in determining whether or not that decision or act is entitled to
discretionary function immunity. Surprisingly, neither the Louisiana Su-
preme Court nor lower appellate courts have yet to rely particularly
upon subparagraph C(1) of the Louisiana statute. However, recent Louis-
iana appellate court decisions, relying upon the plurality opinion in
Fowler, have appeared to assess the reasonableness of the policy jus-
tification accorded to the challenged official act or decision in deter-
mining whether to apply the Louisiana exception. 4
B. Louisiana's Post-Gaubert Jurisprudence
A little over one year after Fowler was decided, the United States
Supreme Court handed down Gaubert. During the two years since Gaub-
ert was decided, a number of Louisiana appellate courts, relying upon
Fowler, have adhered to the federal Berkovitz standards, while also
continuing to apply the "operational test" repudiated by Gaubert. These
Louisiana decisions have not referred to Gaubert and have not applied
its presumption that discretionary conduct permitted by statute, regu-
lation, or guideline is grounded in policy and therefore entitled to
immunity. 49
A number of Louisiana decisions, for example, have held that gov-
ernmental decisions and actions pertaining to the design and maintenance
of public roadways and other public facilities, although involving par-
ticularized discretionary judgments, are "operational" in nature and thus
not entitled to discretionary function immunity. In Chaney v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp.,50 the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal
held that a city's decisions on the type, number, sufficiency, and place-
ment of warning devices at railroad crossings were "operational" in
48. E.g., Simeon v. Doe, 602 So. 2d 77, 82 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), aff'd, No.
92-C-2353, slip opinion (La. May 24, 1993) (holding that the decision of the Department
of Health and Human Resources to publicize only to medical professionals, and not to
the general public, the danger of raw shellfish to persons with immune deficiencies was
a discretionary function, in part because the DHHR was able to provide a reasonable
policy justification for its decision); Dubois v. McGuire, 579 So. 2d 1025, 1028-30 (La.
App. 4th Cir.) (holding that a parish health department's decision to return stray dogs
with collar tags to owners, instead of impounding dogs or criminally prosecuting dog
owners, was a discretionary function and emphasizing the policy justification offered by
the parish health department), writ denied sub nom., Dubois v. Waterman, 587 So. 2d
696 (1991).
49. E.g., Kniepp v. City of Shreveport, 609 So. 2d 1163 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992),
writ denied, 613 So. 2d 976 (1993); Estate of Thomas v. State, 604 So. 2d 617 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 167 (1992); Insley v. Titan Ins. Co., 589 So. 2d 10
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1991); Chaney v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 583 So. 2d 926 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991).
50. Chaney, 583 So. 2d at 929.
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nature because the legislature had already made the "policy decision"
that public roadways should be maintained in a reasonably safe con-
dition. Under the Chaney court's analysis, all discretionary judgments
regarding the design, maintenance, and repair of a roadway, including
method of construction, number and placement of signs and signals,
and level of maintenance, would be "operational" decisions that would
fall outside of the protection of the Louisiana exception. The court's
analysis indicates a view that the only decision applicable to a roadway
that would be protected by the discretionary function exception would
be the initial decision of whether to construct it or assume responsibility
for it."
As of the date this article is submitted for publication, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has not addressed the Gaubert decision or its impact
upon the Louisiana exception. 2 There are serious questions as to whether
the Chaney line of decisions would survive scrutiny under the Gaubert
presumption and its repudiation of the "operational" doctrine. Under
the Gaubert analysis, so-called "operational" decisions regarding design
and maintenance of buildings, roadways, and other public facilities,
although involving technical and particularized discretionary judgments,
could easily be presumed to have been grounded in the policies of state
departments or agencies, or in departmental guidelines, regulations, or
safety statutes. If the Louisiana Supreme Court's continued adherence
to federal standards were put to the test and the Gaubert standards
followed, a broad and diverse range of state and municipal actions,
decisions, and functions, heretofore considered "operational" in nature,
51. Id. at 930. See also Estate of Thomas, 604 So. 2d at 625 (holding that the
decision on where to place highway signs was "operational"); Insley, 589 So. 2d at 13-
14 (holding that whether a decision is "operational" is a question of fact and citing
Verdun v. State Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 559 So. 2d 877, 879 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1990)); Valet v. City of Hammond, 577 So. 2d 155, 166 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991) (rendered three weeks before Gaubert, holding maintenance of roadway to be
"operational").
52. On May 24, 1993, after this article was submitted for publication, the Louisiana
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Simeon v. Doe, No. 92-C-2353, slip opinion
(La. May 24, 1993). A five-justice majority, affirming the appellate court, accorded
discretionary function immunity to the Louisiana Department of Health and Human
Resources' decision to publish only to medical professionals the dangers of raw shellfish
to consumers with immune deficiencies. The majority opinion relied upon Fowler and the
federal Berkovitz test, but made no reference to Gaubert. Nor did the court address the
constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798.1. See discussion in part IV, below.
Justice Watson, in dissent, believed that the DHHR's decision not to warn the general
public was not based on public policy considerations and hence was not entitled to
discretionary function protection. Notably, Justice Watson cited Gaubert for the proposition
that "[a]lthough decisions at an operational level can be discretionary, a choice must be
grounded in social, economic or political policy to be shielded by the exception."
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could be afforded protection under the Louisiana discretionary function
exception.
Should the Louisiana courts adopt the Gaubert analysis and pre-
sumption, subparagraph C(1) of the Louisiana discretionary function
statute could attain a greater significance in the Louisiana jurisprudence.
The Louisiana courts could well resort to that subparagraph as the basis
for imposing a standard of reasonableness upon discretionary acts or
decisions which, although rooted in agency policy, are not "reasonably
related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policy-
making or discretionary power exists."" Subparagraph C(l) of the Louis-
iana statute may come to be employed by Louisiana courts as a basis
for refusing to immunize governmental decisions that amount to ex-
ceedingly arbitrary, unreasonable, or bad policy. As discussed above,
recent Louisiana appellate decisions, although not relying upon subpar-
agraph C(l) particularly, appear to assess the reasonableness of the
policy justification offered in support of the challenged governmental
conduct or decision. 54
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
As observed by other commentators, there are serious questions
concerning the constitutionality of the Louisiana discretionary function
statute." The Louisiana discretionary function statute, passed in 1985,
may well run afoul of Article XII, section 10(A) of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974. That provision constitutes a blanket waiver of the
sovereign immunity of the state and its political subdivisions "from suit
and liability in contract or for injury to person or property. 56 In obvious
anticipation of constitutional challenges based upon Louisiana Consti-
tution article XII, section 10(A), the legislature, in subparagraph (D) of
the Louisiana discretionary function statute, purported to explain that
the statute was not intended to "reestablish any immunity based on the
status of sovereignty but rather to clarify the substantive content and
parameters of application of such legislatively created codal articles and
laws and also to assist in the implementation of Article II of the
Constitution of Louisiana." The legislature's proffered "explanation,"
however, may not hold water with the Louisiana courts. It will be for
the judicial branch, and not the legislative, to determine whether the
53. La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C) (1991).
54. See cases cited supra note 48.
55. These constitutional issues are addressed in Professor David Robertson's excellent
article, Tort Liability of Governmental Units in Louisiana, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 857, 862-71
(1990). See also Robert R. Peebles, Jr., Governmental Tort Liability in Louisiana: A
Response to Professor Robertson and a Call for More Study, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1055 (1991).
56. La. Const. art. XII, § 10(A).
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Louisiana discretionary function statute impermissibly reinstates a con-
clave of sovereign immunity in violation of the Louisiana Constitution. 7
Given that the discretionary function exception arose historically as an
exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity, the constitutional un-
certainties surrounding the Louisiana statute cannot be taken lightly.5
These constitutional issues are underscored by two Louisiana Su-
preme Court decisions addressing the relationship between other statutes
and Louisiana Constitution article XII, section 10(A). In Segura v.
Louisiana Architects Selection Board, 9 the court held that a pre-1974
statute exempting the state from payment of court costs was superseded
by Louisiana's constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity in 1974. The
court reasoned that "the consequence [of the statute] would be that the
State was relieved of part of its liability. The Constitution makes no
such concession."' 6 In Jones v. City of Baton Rouge,6 the court held
that the imposition of Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 strict liability
upon municipalities was entirely consistent with Louisiana's constitutional
waiver of sovereign immunity. The court stated,
Article 12, § 10 of the 1974 Constitution states that "[n]either
the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision shall be
immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to
person or property." It is not the function of the courts to
create an exception to this unequivocal constitutional rejection
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 62
In Fowler, the plurality, on rehearing, pretermitted consideration of
the constitutional challenges to the Louisiana discretionary function stat-
ute.63 However, in Industrial Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc.," the federal district court, applying Louisiana law, upheld the
57. E.g., Robertson, supra note 55, at 869-72. As Professor Robertson points out,
an unconstitutional statute cannot be salvaged by a legislative "explanation" that the
legislature did not intend to violate the constitution. Under the most fundamental separation
of powers principles, the judicial branch must determine whether a legislative act violates
a provision of the Louisiana Constitution.
58. Id. at 870; Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 27:11, at 60-65 (2d
ed. 1984); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton On the Law of Torts § 131, at
1039 (5th ed. 1984). Professor Robertson also believes that, because the Louisiana dis-
cretionary function statute "arguably treats governmental defendants differently from
similarly situated private defendants," it may be subject to equal protection challenges.
Robertson, supra note 55, at 870.
59. 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978).
60. Id. at 499.
61. 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980).
62. Id. at 740. See also Professor Robertson's discussion of the Jones and Segura
decisions, supra note 55, at 863-64.
63. Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 17 n.12 (La. 1989) (on rehearing).
64. 735 F. Supp. 200, 202 (E.D. La. 1990).
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constitutionality of the statute, finding that it did not conflict with
Article XII, section 10(A). The federal court predicated its holding upon
the rationale of the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion on original
hearing in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University.6
In Sibley, the court, on original hearing, held that a statute limiting
the amount of a medical malpractice award against the state and state
agencies did not violate Article XII, section 10(A) of the Louisiana
Constitution. The court opined that Louisiana's constitutional waiver of
sovereign immunity in contract and tort was intended primarily to elim-
inate the requirement of legislative approval for the filing of suit against
the state. The court believed that the drafters of Louisiana Constitution
article XII, section 10 did not intend to prohibit the legislature from
limiting or restricting tort recovery in particular types of suits.66
The Sibley court, however, granted a rehearing. On rehearing, the
court held that the plaintiff's challenges to the statute. under Article
XII, section 10(A) were rendered moot by intervening amendments to
the statute.6 7 Because the Sibley court's grant of rehearing had the legal
effect of vacating its original opinion, the court's analysis of the intent
of the drafters of Article XII, section 10(A) in its original opinion is
not authoritative. For the same reason, the federal district court's de-
cision in Industrial Risk Insurers, predicated upon the Sibley court's
original opinion, is of questionable authority.
The rationale of the Sibley court's original opinion, that Article
XII, section 10(A) was intended to remove a bar to suits against the
state, but not to prohibit the state from limiting or restricting recovery
in particular cases, appears to be consistent with the legislative history
of Article XII, section 10(A).6s The Sibley court's original opinion,
however, appears to conflict directly with the reasoning and holding of
the court's Segura decision, in which it held that a statute exempting
the state from a particular element of recovery was contrary to Article
XII, section 10(A).6 9 Until such time as the Louisiana Supreme Court
accepts an invitation to rule on the constitutionality of the Louisiana
65. 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985) (on original hearing).
66. Id. at 154 (on original hearing).
67. Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1109 (La.
1985).
68. E.g., Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 154 (on original hearing) ("The transcripts [from the
1973 Constitutional Convention] indicate that the proponents of this waiver were primarily
interested in eliminating the unnecessary, burdensome and costly first step of getting
legislative approval in order to bring suit against the state or its subdivisions. . . . Therefore,
we simply find no basis to support plaintiff's contention that the Louisiana Constitution
by denying the state immunity from suit in contract or tort or for injury to person or
property, prohibits the Legislature's limiting in any respect recoverable tort damages").
69. Segura v. Louisiana Architects Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498, 499 (La. 1978).
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discretionary function statute, these very serious, questions as to its
constitutionality will persist. 70
V. PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE
Before the legislature enacted the discretionary function exception
in 1985, Louisiana courts had accorded state and local governmental
entities and their employees a measure of governmental immunity through
application of the "public duty doctrine." 71 Under the public duty
doctrine, "if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an
officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate
or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury,
and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. '72
A few Louisiana courts have opined that the discretionary function
exception contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798.1 was but a
codification of the public duty doctrine. 73 These courts held that Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 9:2798.1 should be applied retroactively because
it was merely a codification of the existing jurisprudential public duty
doctrine.7 4 In Socorro v. City of New Orleans,75 however, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, with only brief discussion, held that Louisiana Revised
Satutes 9:2798.1 cannot be applied retroactively because it "is a sub-
stantive law to be given prospective application only. ' 7 6 The supreme
70. The same constitutional cloud hangs over other post-1974 Louisiana statutes that
purport to exempt governmental entities from particular types of tort liability or elements
of tort recovery. E.g., Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800 (enacted July 12, 1985, and
exempting the state and its political subdivisions from Article 2317 strict liability for
public things other than buildings); Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106 (amended in 1985
to impose a $500,000 ceiling on general damages, exclusive of medical care and loss of
earnings, recoverable against the state, state agencies, and political subdivisions). See
Professor Robertson's discussion, supra note 55, at 871-73, 876-79.
71. E.g., Lott v. Lander, 452 So. 2d 1266, 1269-70 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
458 So. 2d 119, 125 (1984); Dufrene v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097, 1099-1101 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1977), writ denied, 343 So. 2d 1069 (1977).
72. Persilver v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp., 592 So. 2d 1344, 1347 n.2 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1991) (in dicta) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts,
or the Wrongs Which Arise Independently of Contract § 300, at 385 (4th ed. 1932)).
73. E.g., Kniepp v. City of Shreveport, 609 So. 2d 1163, 1170 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1992) (Brown, J., dissenting) ("R.S. 9:2798.1 is a codification of the old 'public duty
doctrine' which granted immunity against tort claims to the state and its subdivisions for
their discretionary functions"), writ denied, 613 So. 2d 976 (1993); Winstead v. Ed's Live
Catfish & Seafood, Inc., 554 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (citing other
cases), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 570 (1990).
74. E.g., Winstead, 554 So. 2d at 1242. In Fowler, the Louisiana Supreme Court,
on rehearing, pretermitted consideration of the issue of the retroactivity of the Louisiana
discretionary function statute. Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 17 n.12 (La. 1989) (on
rehearing).
75. 579 So. 2d 931 (La. 1991).
76. Id. at 944-45.
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court did not address whether the discretionary function statute merely
codified prior jurisprudential doctrines, nor did it mention the legisla-
ture's explanation, provided in subparagraph D of the statute, that the
"purpose" of the statute was "not to reestablish any immunity based
on the status of sovereignty but rather to clarify the substantive content
and parameters of application of such legislatively created codal articles
and laws." The Louisiana Supreme Court has defined "substantive"
laws as creating new legal principles and obligations, and procedural or
interpretative laws as "relating to the form of the proceeding or the
operation of the laws." ' 77 The Socorro decision therefore could be read
to recognize implicitly that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798.1 purported
to restore a substantive governmental immunity that had not existed
after 1974.78
In Fowler, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in its opinion on original
hearing, 79 referred to its earlier decision in Stewart v. Schmiedere0 as
repudiating the public duty doctrine as an absolute or categorical rule.
The Fowler court on original hearing criticized the public duty doctrine
as involving "the intellectually questionable concept that when a gov-
ernmental body owes a duty to everyone, the result is a duty to no
one." The court, however, recognized that the Stewart decision had
stopped short of a total rejection of the "public duty" concept:
On the other hand, the Stewart decision did not hold (and we
do not here hold) that a governmental body will be liable any
time a person's injury could have been prevented by a public
official's proper performance of an inspection or similar func-
tion. The existence of a duty and the scope of liability resulting
from a breach of that duty must be decided according to the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. We therefore
conclude that governmental agencies in the performance of gov-
ernmental functions may be subjected to the imposition of certain
duties, the breach of which may result in liability for damages
.to those injured by a risk contemplated by that duty. 2
Because the Fowler plurality, on rehearing, reinstated the court's original
opinion as supplemented by the rehearing opinion, 3 the original opinion
77. E.g., Graham v. Sequoya Corp., 478 So. 2d 1223, 1226 (La. 1985); Socorro, 579
So. 2d at 944 n.12.
78. E.g., Robertson, supra note 55, at 869, in which Professor Robertson states his
belief that "[tlhe clear intent of section 9:2798.1 is to restore governmental units' immunity
for a large range of their activities. It seems disingenuous to contend that the statute
does not change the law."
79. Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 7 (La. 1989) (on original hearing).
80. 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980).
81. Fowler, 556 So. 2d at 7 (on original hearing).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 17 (on rehearing).
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can be viewed as authoritative of the plurality's position on the current
viability of the public duty doctrine in Louisiana law.
The Fowler analysis appears to apply the public duty doctrine as
an element of the duty-risk analysis. If the "public duty" alleged to
have been breached encompassed the particular risk forming the basis
of the plaintiff's suit, liability may be imposed upon the governmental
agency or employee for breach of that duty. 4
Since Fowler was decided, Louisiana appellate courts have continued
to apply or refer to the public duty doctrine in their opinions." While
the continued viability of the public duty doctrine is unclear, recent
decisions indicate that the Louisiana courts, perhaps following the lan-
guage of Fowler on original hearing, are continuing to apply the public
duty doctrine through the rubric of the duty-risk analysis. Under these
cases, if the "public duty" alleged to have been breached is not found
to have been designed to protect against the particular risk to the
particular class of individuals of which the plaintiff is a member, the
governmental defendant is exonerated.16 Because the public duty doctrine
84. Id. at 7 (on original hearing).
85. E.g., Sunlake Apartment Residents v. Tonti Dev. Corp., 602 So. 2d 22 (La.
App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 607 So. 2d 558, 559 (1992); Persilver v. Louisiana Dep't of
Transp., 592 So. 2d 1344, 1347 n.2 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (citing numerous cases and
authorities); Chance v. State, 567 So. 2d 683, 686 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (citing other
cases and authorities and stating that Stewart was possibly overruled by enactment of La.
R.S. 9:2798.1).
86. E.g., Chance, 567 So. 2d at 686 (finding that, under the "public duty" doctrine,
the general public duty owed by a policeman can form the basis for recovery by a
particular plaintiff only if the general public duty was "transformed into a duty owed
to the plaintiff personally due to the establishment of a one-on-one relationship through
closeness and proximity of time," or a statute or ordinance setting forth the public duty
'indicates by its language that the duty is designed to protect a particular class of
individuals.' (citing Zeagler v. Town of Jena, 556 So. 2d 978, 981 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 560 So. 2d 14 (1990), citing Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351, 1358
(La. 1980)). The court exonerated a sheriff from liability to the Department of Trans-
portation and Development (DOTD), finding that the sheriff's public duty was not owed
to the particular class of individuals into which the DOTD fell); Sunlake Apartment
Residents v. Tonti Dev. Corp., 602 So. 2d 22, 26 (La. App. 5th Cir.) (exonerating state
and local fire and safety departments and officials of liability for an apartment fire,
relying upon the Fowler opinion on original hearing), writ denied, 607 So. 2d 558, 559
(1992); Kniepp v. City of Shreveport, 609 So. 2d 1163, 1169 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992)
(exonerating a city from liability for police officers' handling of a riot), writ denied, 613
So. 2d 976 (1993). Although immunizing the city from liability under the discretionary
function exception, the Kniepp court also stated that
[b]ecause the duty of a policeman under these circumstances is not specifically
delineated by statute, we find no one-to-one duty which constitutes an exception
to the public duty doctrine. See Smith v. City of Kenner, 428 So. 2d 1171,
1174 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983). Likewise, we find no personal or individual
relationship between SPD and plaintiffs, and hence no transformation of the
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can be expressed easily through duty-risk principles, it is likely that the
courts will continue to apply "public duty" concepts as elements of the
duty-risk analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
This area of the law is developing at an extremely rapid pace. 7 As
discussed above, if Louisiana courts followed Gaubert, the Louisiana
discretionary function exception could be extended to immunize a broad
range of operational actions and functions of state and municipal entities
and employees that have in the past been held subject to tort liability.
There is, indeed, evidence that Louisiana jurisprudence is moving
toward extending the application of the Louisiana exception even without
reference to the Gaubert decision. In Kniepp v. City of Shreveport,"s
the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that city police
officers' handling of a violent riot, including their particularized decisions
as to crowd control, withdrawal of officers from the riot scene, and
other seemingly operational decisions, were "reasonably related to a
public policy-based governmental objective to protect life" 8 9 and there-
fore entitled to discretionary function immunity. The Kniepp court relied
upon Fowler and federal jurisprudence, but made no reference to Gaub-
ert. Perhaps the appellate courts are awaiting the Louisiana Supreme
Court's ruling on the applicability of Gaubert.
public duty into an individual duty. See and compare Kendrick v. City of Lake
Charles, 500 So. 2d 866, 870 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
Id.
87. Louisiana's discretionary function exception may be impacted by Senate Resolution
No. 44 of the legislature's regular session of 1992. That resolution purports to "create
and provide for the Tort Claims Study Commission to study and make specific recom-
mendations with respect to a procedure for tort claims against the state and political
subdivisions of the state." The resolution requires, in part, that the study commission
make recommendations to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding the feasibility
of enacting a comprehensive Louisiana Tort Claims Act and to make other recommen-
dations regarding the consolidation of statutory limitations of liability, effects of judgments,
and other matters affecting the tort liability of Louisiana and its political subdivisions.
The resolution requires the commission to give recommendations and findings to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure by
February 28, 1993. S. Res. 44, 18th Leg. Regular Sess. (1992). Staff members with the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary have informed the authors that the required written
report of findings and recommendations has not been submitted. The current status of
the study commission and its efforts, if any, remains uncertain.
Any such comprehensive tort claims act probably should be enacted by constitutional
amendment so as to avoid the constitutionality problems discussed in the text.
88. Kniepp, 609 So. 2d at 1163.
89. Id. at 1168. Judge Brown wrote a vigorous dissent, opining that the challenged
actions were operational in nature and therefore unprotected. Id. at 1170 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
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The jurisprudential tests and standards defining the scope of the
federal and Louisiana discretionary function exceptions are fluid, amor-
phous, and difficult to apply. The discretionary function exception is
commonly implicated in cases involving the most tragic of circum-
stances.20 Understandably, consistency of analysis and result may be
harder to achieve in such difficult, emotionally wrought cases. The
resulting uncertainty in the law, however, disserves both governmental
and private interests. Judicial action is needed to resolve the legal issues
discussed in this article and to calm the troubled waters of this difficult
area of the law.
90. In Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 14 (La. 1989) (on rehearing), for example,
an epileptic driver, after receiving a renewed driver's license without having submitted a
medical report, suffered a seizure behind the wheel, killed two motorists, and seriously
injured two more. In Berkovitz v. U.S., 486 U.S. 531, 533, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1957 (1988),
a child contracted polio and became almost totally paralyzed after ingesting a tainted
polio vaccine which had been approved by a federal agency.
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